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Paris School of Economics 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
In this paper, I study the wage premium associated with firm-level union recognition in 
France and show that this premium is due to a rent-extraction phenomenon. Using a large 
matched employer-employee dataset from a 2002 survey in France, I first estimate a series of 
wage determination models that control for individual and firm-level characteristics. I find 
that union recognition is associated with a 2-3% wage premium. To show that this premium 
results from a non-competitive phenomenon, I construct a bargaining model and estimate it 
empirically using a smaller but very detailed matched employer-employee dataset for 2004. 
The model predicts in particular that the wage premium obtained by unions should increase 
both with their bargaining power and with the amount of quasi-rents available in the firms 
they organize. These predictions are validated empirically when I use the firms’ market share 
as a proxy for their quasi-rents and the percentage of unionized as a proxy for the unions’ 
bargaining power. All the results remain valid when I control for the firm-level workers’ 
average productivity.  
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Orley Ashenfelter, Philippe Askenazy, Francesco Avvisati, Sandra Black, Eve Caroli, 
Andrew Clark, Gregory Ponthière and Yanos Zylberberg for their helpful comments on this manuscript. 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
Why are unionized workers paid more than their non-unionized counterparts? An 
obvious explanation, often called the “causal effect” of unions, is that unions raise wages 
through bargaining and rent extraction. But a wide range of alternative explanations are 
possible: unionized workers can be more productive than non-unionized ones (selection of 
unionized workers), organized firms can have unobserved characteristics correlated with 
higher wages (selection of organized firms) and wage gains for unionized workers can be 
counterbalanced by losses on other aspects (compensating wage differentials). Due to 
econometric limitations, studies are often unable to disentangle completely those various 
explanations. Typically, microeconomic studies based on a sample of workers may potentially 
confound bargaining status with other firm-level characteristics such as firm size. This is the 
case for a huge body of studies in the United States that finds sizeable union wage premiums2. 
However, more recently DiNardo and Lee (2004) used a regression discontinuity design 
technique to identify the “causal effect” of unions. Using a sample of U.S. establishments that 
changed union status as a result of a union certification election, they found no effect of union 
coverage on wages.  
  Consistent with the rent-extraction interpretation is the idea that the wage differential 
between unionized and non-unionized firms3 should be increasing both with the amount of 
rent per worker available to the unionized firms and with the bargaining power of unions in 
these firms. In this paper, I derive these two predictions from a simple bargaining model and 
test it using a detailed linked employer/employee dataset from the French private sector. First, 
the data contains subjective information on the surveyed firms’ market share. Under the 
assumption that firms declaring a high market share should have on average more rents per 
worker that unions can potentially extract than those declaring a low market share, I split the 
sample of firms in two groups according to their declared market shares. I then compare the 
ceteris paribus wage differential between unionized and non unionized firms obtained in 
these two groups. I argue that a higher differential observed in the group of high-market-share 
firms would strongly reinforce the rent extraction interpretation of the wage differential 
between organized and non organized firms. Second, France is a country of “open-shop” 
                                                 
2 Studies that use a panel of workers from the Current Population Survey (CPS) cannot take in account firm’s 
characteristics.  See Lewis (1986) for an extensive survey of the early literature and Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
or Card (1996) for famous examples based on the CPS.   
3 In this paper I focus on the usual “union recognition wage premium”, that is the wage differential between 
workers who are covered by unions at the firm level and those who are not covered. 
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unionism, with no requirement for workers to be unionized when a union is recognized in 
their firm. I argue that a larger proportion of unionized workers in a firm where a union is 
recognized indicates a higher support toward the union and thus a higher bargaining power of 
the union. The rent-extraction view of union wage differentials then predicts that the wage 
premium obtained by unions should increase with the proportion of unionized workers in 
organized firms. I take advantage of the information available on the proportion of unionized 
workers in the dataset I use to test empirically this second prediction. The workers’ bargaining 
power is likely to be endogenous to the rents available in their firm (the higher their potential 
gains, the higher the incentive for workers to pay the cost to organize and bargain 
collectively). I thus estimate a structural wage equation derived from a simple bargaining 
model that models simultaneously the rents per worker available at the firm level and the 
workers’ bargaining power. Finally, the workers’ productivity is also likely to be endogenous 
to the rents available in their firm (more productive workers are more likely to generate higher 
profits and rents). To control for this possible selection effect, I use the workers average 
productivity at the firm level as an additional explanatory variable in some of my regression 
models.  
 A second important feature of this study is that it focuses on France, a country which 
has the reputation to have extremely powerful unions. According to an article by Craig Smith 
published in the New York Times in 20064, “Despite one of the lowest rates of unionization 
— only about 8 percent of the French work force are members — the unions have enormous 
leverage over the government. They play a unique organizational role in France's hierarchical 
society, rallying the populace accustomed to a confrontational relationship with leaders 
considered elitist. Spark-plug unions, some people call them.” This commonly accepted view 
on the strength of French unions relies on evidence at the national level and on large national 
strikes or demonstrations occurring from time to time and largely advertized in the general 
media. But what is the strength of French unions at the firm level?  
 I answer this question by comparing the wage differential between organized and non 
organized firms I obtain in the private sector for France with measures of this differential 
obtained aboard. In particular, using a dataset similar to theirs, I reproduce the main empirical 
specifications of Card and De La Rica (2006) who studied the wage premium associated with 
firm-level contracting in Spain. As France and Spain are neighbor countries with similar 
                                                 
4 See the following webpage for the entire article: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/international/europe/29unions.html 
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industrial relation systems, the comparison should shed some light on the real strength of 
French unions at a decentralized level. 
 
Institutional Settings 
 
The legal settings of union representation in France have been slightly modified on the 
4th of May 2004 and more recently on the 20th of August 2008. As this study focuses on years 
2002 and 2004, I describe the functioning of industrial relations before these two laws were 
passed. I begin with a brief description of industry-level bargaining and then turn to a more 
precise description of firm-level industrial relations. 
At first sight, France shares with most continental Europe countries characteristics of a 
regulated industrial relation system with multi-level bargaining. First, industry wide 
agreements negotiated by unions and employer associations cover most of the workforce. 
Second, individual employers can sign firm specific agreements with unions when unions are 
recognized at the firm level.  According to the Statistics Department of the French Ministry of 
Labor (DARES), 97.7% of the workforce was covered by a collective agreement in 2004. 
With a union density around 8%, France is the OECD country with both the highest coverage 
rate and the lowest union density (OECD Employment Outlook, 2004).  
Industry-level bargaining is organized by branches. A branch is a bargaining unit 
regrouping workers in a same industry or group of industries, sometimes in a delimited region 
and sometimes also with a specific occupation5. When an agreement is signed in a branch 
between unions and an employer association, only the firms whose the employer is a member 
of the association are initially covered. An extension of the agreement for all workers in the 
branch can be asked by unions, the government or another employer association. The 
extension is made as soon as the agreement is proved conform to the general law6. In practice, 
the extension mechanism is very common (Barrat and Daniel 2002), which explains that most 
of the workforce is covered by industry-wide agreements. 
 In 1982, the Loi Auroux (August 4, 1982) encouraged decentralized bargaining. As a 
consequence, industry-level bargaining became less significant (Barrat et al 1996). Some of 
the existing agreements are even outdated because they have been rarely renegotiated in the 
                                                 
5 For example, white collars workers in the construction sector bargain at the national level whereas other 
occupations bargain at the regional level (see Ayouvi-Dovi et al, 2009).  
6 This differs, on the one hand from Spain where industry-level agreements are automatically extended to the 
entire industry and, on the other hand from Germany where conditions of representativeness are also necessary 
for the extension (see Du Caju et al. 2008 for details). 
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past two decades and are now weaker than national standards in many sectors and regarding 
many topics. In 2006, exactly 50% of the 160 branches covering more than 5,000 employees7 
had a branch minimum wage which was below the national minimum wage and was 
consequently useless. Figure 1 illustrates this point and plots the French national minimum 
wage in 2006 as well as the distribution of the 160 largest branch minimum wages. To 
summarize, almost all workers are covered by industry-level agreements (which render 
impossible, in the absence of a comparison group, the identification of the effect of these 
contracts on wages) but a lot of these contracts are weak or even outdated, which should leave 
room for unions to bargain at the firm level.  
Making comparisons between the degree of bargaining at the national, industry and 
firm level, the 2004 OECD Employment Outlook classifies France in the second group of 
OECD countries with the most decentralized bargaining institutions (with Australia, Italy, the 
Slovak Republic and Switzerland) just behind the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Poland, Korea and 
Japan. Regarding this classification, I only focus on the union wage premium at the firm level, 
similarly to the approach taken in Anglo-Saxon studies (where bargaining in the private sector 
is only decentralized) and by Card and De La Rica for Spain (2006). In that sense, my 
approach differs from a recent literature on continental Europe countries which focuses on 
industry-level bargaining or examines the relative influence of the different levels of 
bargaining on the overall structure of wages (Ayouvi-Dovi et al 2009, Cardoso and Portugal 
2005, Fitzenberg et al 2007, Plasman et al 2007, Rusinek and Rycx 2008).  
  
 Firm-level agreements can be signed between unions and employers as soon as unions 
have been recognized within firms. Concerning wages, these agreements can only improve 
the industry minimum wage and must be above the national minimum wage. Three key 
features differentiate France from Anglo-Saxon countries concerning union coverage at the 
firm level: first, there is no certification election, second, many unions can be present in the 
same firm and represent workers collectively and third, unionism is completely “open shop”. 
 
There is no certification election: 
To be recognized in a firm with more than 50 employees, the main unions almost only 
need to find one worker who accepts to officially represent the union in the firm. Such a 
                                                 
7 There are about 700 branches in total. The Ministry of Labor provides information on the 160 that cover more 
than 5,000 employees each. In total, these branches cover more than one half of the private sector total 
employment.   
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worker is called a union representative. Table 1 presents a brief description of the main 
French unions and gives the distribution of the union representatives in terms of the unions 
they belong to. We can see that more than 95% of union representatives belong to only 5 large 
national “historical” unions. These “historical” unions are recognized as legal bargaining units 
within firms as soon as a worker accepts to be their representative8. This is a fundamental 
feature of the French industrial relations: there is no certification election required for 
historical unions to organize larger firms. In firms with size between 10 and 50 employees, 
unions have to choose their representatives among workers who have already been elected, 
the so-called “firm delegates”. These “firm delegates” are legally recognized non-union 
representatives acting as the voice of the workers in their day-to-day relationship with the 
employer (they are generally also members of the work councils). They are elected every four 
years by workers in firms with more than 10 employees among voluntary candidates in a 
simple majority rule voting (the winning candidates are simply those that have collected the 
larger number of votes). The process of union recognition is more binding in firms with size 
between 10 and 50 employees, but even in these firms, union recognition remains less binding 
than the U.S. certification process which requires a majority of workers to be pro-union. The 
very weak legal constraints bearing on firm-level union recognition makes it easier for unions 
to legally organize firms and get a legal framework to bargain over wages officially. 
However, the low organizational cost paid by unions in these firms and the fact that they are 
not necessarily supported by the majority of the workforce should limit their bargaining 
power and the scope of their action.  
 
Different unions can organize the same firm: 
 The recognition process described above applies to each union, which makes in theory 
unlimited the total number of unions that can cover the workers of a given firm. Table 2 
shows the distribution of the workplaces in terms of the number of unions present in them. 
The second column gives the non weighted distribution in the dataset I use- the REPONSE 
data described in the next section- whereas the third and fourth columns are obtained using 
weights that make the data representative of French private sector workplaces with more than 
20 employees or of the workers in those workplaces. It can be derived from table 2 that 
around 36% of the private sector workplaces with more than 20 employees are organized, 
which represents 64% of the workforce in these workplaces. This discrepancy is explained by 
                                                 
8 The other non historical unions might have to win a certification election to be recognized at the firm level if 
the employer or a worker asks for it. 
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the fact that the firm’s probability to be organized increases considerably with its size (see 
table A1 in appendix A).  
 
Unionism is completely “open shop”: 
 When one or more unions are recognized in a firm, in place and newly hired 
employees do not have the duty to become union members, neither to participate in strikes. 
This enables me to use the percentage of unionized workers at the establishment-level as a 
measure of the unions’ bargaining power. Finally, union contracts must apply to all workers 
in the firm. For this reason, I will study the effect of unions on both the wages of unionized 
and non-unionized workers. 
Finally, the institutional settings concerning industrial relations and bargaining at the 
establishment level are exactly identical to the institutional settings at the firm level which is 
described above. As it appears to be more relevant, I conduct the empirical analysis of the 
effect of union recognition on wages at the establishment level9.  
 
Data description 
 
 The empirical analysis relies on two sources of data. First, the 2002 French Wage 
Structure Survey (ESS02) collected detailed salary and job information for up to 60 
employees in each of some 15,000 private sector establishments in the manufacturing, 
construction, trade and service industries. The design of the survey allows to model wage 
outcomes at the employee level while including controls for establishment characteristics. 
Agriculture, mining, and household services are missing from the ESS02 sample as are small 
establishments (less than 10 employees). As firm-level union coverage is extremely low for 
small workplaces and in the industries missing from ESS02, the limited coverage of the 
ESS02 is not a major problem for my study. I have excluded from the sample chief executives 
as well as workers having their wage in the first and last percentiles of the hourly wage 
distribution. 
 The second dataset I use is the 2004 French Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(REPONSE04) conducted by the Ministry of Labor towards up to 10 employees in each of 
2929 business establishments with more than 20 employees. REPONSE04 contains extensive 
                                                 
9 It is difficult to know exactly what the actual bargaining unit is. For mono-establishment firms, establishment-
level and firm-level union recognition are of course confounded. Multi-establishments firms are large enough to 
always have in practice unions recognized at the firm-level. For these firms, only establishment-level union 
recognition varies enough to offer a matter of comparison.  
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information on industrial relations at the workplace level and on the firms’ organizational and 
technological structure. In each surveyed workplace, union density, the name of the unions 
that are present and the existence of a firm-level contract are available. I will use union 
density to proxy the union’s bargaining power. REPONSE04 also contains information on the 
market share of each establishment, as declared by its manager. I will use this information to 
proxy the firm’s market power and potential rents. Net hourly wages in December 2003 have 
been retrieved from Social Security records (the Déclaration Annuelles de Données Sociales, 
DADS) by the Ministry of Labor for the workers surveyed in REPONSE04 and have been 
matched with the dataset. I have also excluded from the data sample chief executives10.  The 
REPONSE04 survey covers mainly the private sectors but some public companies are also 
present, as well as non-profit associations and cooperative firms. Since this paper focuses on 
unions and rent-sharing, I have removed these observations and kept a final sample of 2451 
business establishments owned by private non cooperative firms.   
Comparing to ESS2002, the main inconvenience of REPONSE04 is that it is relatively 
small, and its main advantage is to contain extensive workplace-level information. I use 
ESS2002 to estimate precisely the cross-sectional union wage gap and make comparison with 
similar studies and REPONSE04 to test the more elaborate predictions that these union wage 
gaps should increase with firms’ market shares and workers’ bargaining power if they are due 
to rent extraction11. 
 
The union wage premium in a standard wage determination model 
  
Before turning to a more sophisticated econometric analysis that aims at capturing the 
causal effect of unions on wages, I provide a precise estimation of the union wage premium 
that controls for individual-level and establishment-level observable characteristics. To do so, 
I present a series of regression models of the type:  
ijjiij UXw εαγβ +++= jZ)log(                                                                                              (1) 
                                                 
10 Since wages come from an administrative source, I have not excluded workers having extreme wages. 
However, I have also performed the whole empirical analysis both on the full and truncated samples (removal of 
0.5% or 1% tails of the wage distribution) of both the ESS02 and REPONSE04 datasets. The results (available 
on demand) are always very close. 
11 The two datasets I use have twins in other countries that have been used a lot to study unions. REPONSE 
follows the same design than WERS in the U.K. See Bryson et al. 2009 for a study that uses both REPONSE and 
WERS to study unions and workplace. Wage Structure Surveys similar to ESS have been used by Plasman et al 
(2006) to study the effect of multi-level bargaining on wages in Belgium, Denmark and Spain and Card and De 
La Rica (2006) in Spain.   
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where wij represents the hourly wage of individual i in establishment j, Xi is a set of observed 
skill characteristics (such as age and education) of worker i, Zj a vector of firm-level 
covariates and Uj an indicator for the presence of one or more unions in establishment j. 
Assuming that E[εij|Xi,Zj,Uj]=0, the effect of establishment-level union recognition can be 
estimated consistently by a conventional (OLS) regression applied to (1). 
 The first 3 columns of table 3 present a series of regression models following equation 
(1) on the ESS02 dataset. In the first column (specification 1), only a dummy for union 
recognition at the workplace level is included. The estimated coefficient is just over 20% 
suggesting a large premium associated with union recognition. As shown by the results in 
column 2, more than 80% of this gap is explained by differences in the characteristics of 
workers and firms between unionized and non unionized workplaces. The covariates in this 
specification include the individual worker’s age, education and occupation (both divided in 4 
groups), a dummy indicating whether he or she was employed on a temporary contract, and 
dummies for establishment size, occupation, industry, and region. Many of the control 
variables are highly statistically significant, and their inclusion raises the R-squared above 
60%.  
Estimating a standard wage determination model, Card and De La Rica (2006) found a 
wage premium of around 12% for women and 8% for men for firm-level contracting. To 
describe their results, the authors explained that “these models are very similar to the 
specifications fit in many previous studies of wage determination in the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and continental Europe, and yield estimated premiums for firm-level 
bargaining that are comparable to (or little smaller than) the unionized wage premiums 
typically estimated in the United-States”. Specification 2 of table 3 presents the results of a 
similar wage determination model for France but shows that the wage premium associated 
with establishment-level union recognition is only around 2.5%12. This premium is a lot lower 
than what is found with this kind of cross-sectional approach in most developed countries13. 
                                                 
12 Specification (2) of table 3 tries to reproduce very closely specification (2) of the third table in Card and De La 
Rica. In their specification, they included 2 additional controls for the market orientation and public ownership 
status of the firms that are not available in ESS02 and produced estimations for men and women separately. 
They control for years of education and I use 4 education dummies, they have 16 indicators for regions and 6 for 
industries, I use 10 indicators for regions and 9 for industries. The other control variables are rigorously 
identical. When I produce separate estimations for men and women as they do, I obtain a slightly higher 
coefficient for women than for men (the regression coefficient is 0.028 for women and 0.026 for men). For 
detailed studies of the effect of union recognition on men and women in France, see Leclair and Petit (2004) and 
Duguet and Petit (2009).  
13 The recent study by Blanchflower and Bryson (2010) finds a union wage premium around 5% in UK (private 
sector, years 2001-2006). This is lower than previous estimations for UK but still at least twice larger than my 
estimates for France.  
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Finally, column 3 of table 3 presents the results of a regression model with an extended set of 
control variables: 2-digit industry dummies as well as 10 dummies for age and 4 dummies for 
tenure have also been included as controls. The wage premium associated with union 
recognition at the workplace level is reduced by one additional third (comparing with column 
2). Overall, the results of table 3 are close to those found in older firm-level data studies in 
France (Coutrot, 1996; Laroche 2004). As a robustness check, I have reproduced in appendix 
table A3 the wage models estimated with ESS02 in table 3 using the alternative dataset 
REPONSE04 and I find very similar results.  
In their study of Spain, Card and De La Rica (2006) looked at the effect of firm-level 
contracting (rather than union recognition) on wages. Results for firm-level contracting14 in 
France are presented in columns 4 to 6 of table 3. The estimated coefficient for firm-level 
contracting is not statistically significant and very close to 0 in specifications that include 
controls for workers and firms characteristics. The reason why I use union recognition rather 
than firm-level contracting is that reaching an agreement at the workplace or firm level is not 
necessarily the sign of strong unions. Unions can obtain a wage rise (through the threat of 
strike for example) without signing any agreement. When unions’ demands are very strong 
for instance, the employer might only concede part of it, still leading to wage rises but with no 
final agreement reached. Also, multi-unionism put unions in competition at the firm level. In 
2004, an agreement was considered legally valid as long as it was signed by one union in the 
firm. As a consequence, when more than one union is recognized in a firm, the employer 
might try to reach an agreement with the weakest union, leading to actually smaller wage rises 
than when the agreement is not reached. A practical example of this situation is illustrated by 
the CGT union (see table 1). This union is the most combative of the large French unions. By 
tradition, it signs very few agreements. Nevertheless, Breda (2008) showed with firm-level 
data that CGT obtains the largest wage rises. 
 Why is the union wage premium for France, while this country is supposed to have 
powerful unions, so much smaller compared to that in most other developed countries? A first 
explanation is the existence of a high and binding national minimum wage in France. In 2007, 
12.9% of French workers were paid the national minimum wage (Berry, 2008). This high 
national minimum wage may simply leave little room for further bargaining at a decentralized 
level. A slightly different explanation relies on the work by Aghion et al (2008). France has 
evolved towards an equilibrium (in terms of industrial relations) with a highly regulated 
                                                 
14 The variable “Firm wage contract” is an indicator of the signing of a new workplace or firm-level contract on 
wages in 2002. It is equal to 1 for 62.6% of the observations in ESS2002.  
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minimum wage and poor labor relations. In their view, the state regulation of the minimum 
wage crowds out the possibility for workers and employers to experience negotiation and 
develop trustful labor relations. If we suppose that wage rises at a decentralized level are more 
likely to be obtained when labor relations are good, then a high degree of regulation of the 
minimum wage is a substitute for good labor relations and thus for high wage rises at the 
decentralized level. 
 A second explanation for the low union wage premium in France directly derives from 
the analysis of the French institutional settings. In France, the large national unions are de 
facto recognized in firms or workplaces as soon as they find a worker who accepts to be their 
representative. This is a very weak legal constraint which implies in particular that a union 
can be legally recognized in a firm even though a large majority of the firm’s workers are in 
fact against the union. In this case, the union cannot credibly threaten to begin a strike and its 
bargaining power will certainly be lower, leading to a lower wage premium. Since the cost to 
do so is low, unions have also an incentive to organize a large number of firms rather than just 
selecting those with a very high amount of rents. Table 2 indeed shows that, despite a low 
unionization rate, unions are present in a large number of firms. The small average premium 
associated with union recognition at the decentralized level has thus to be put in the context of 
the relatively large number of workers who benefit from such a premium. Finally, if the 
average quantity of rents available in unionized firms is lower than in other countries because 
unions have selected a larger number of firms, the average wage premium unions can extract 
is also lower. However, if this explanation holds, the union wage premium should be higher -
maybe comparable to what is found in most developed countries- in firms with high potential 
rents. 
 I now push the analysis one step further and build a bargaining model to show that the 
union wage premium associated with union recognition is due to a rent-extraction 
phenomenon and is indeed higher in firms with high potential rents.  
 
Construction of a bargaining model 
The larger the rents and the workers’ bargaining power in a given firm, the higher their 
wages. In this section, I formalize this assumption in a simple bargaining model and derive 
wage equations to be estimated empirically. The goal of this more structural approach is to 
give evidence that the union wage premium is indeed due to bargaining and rent extraction, 
rather than selection effects or compensating wage differentials.  This is done by deriving two 
12 
 
simple testable predictions compatible with the rent extraction story, but much harder to 
explain if one believes that only selection effects and compensating wage differentials are at 
play in the union wage premium.  
 I first assume that in the absence of unions in her firm, worker i in firm j is paid a 
market hourly wage mijw  that depends on her characteristics and on her firm’s characteristics. 
Keeping the notation of the previous section, we have, for workers in non-unionized firms: 
iji
m
ij Xw εγβ ++= jZ)log(                                                                                                        (2)  
 A prominent literature (Abowd and Lemieux 1993; Abowd and Allain 1995; 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey 1996) has shown that a lot of rent-sharing occurs in U.S., 
Canada and France. I nevertheless suppose in equation (2) that rent-sharing does not happen 
at the establishment-level in the absence of unions. Regarding the French law, actual firm-
level bargaining (face to face discussion between the employer and a worker representative) 
can indeed only happen when unions are recognized. But one could think that implicit 
bargaining could still occur in non-unionized firm, leading to some rent-sharing. The 
existence of industry-level bargaining in France, even if weak (see above), might also imply 
some rent-sharing in non-unionized firms. Kramarz (2008) estimates a bargaining model with 
a large longitudinal dataset for France and shows that there is no rent-sharing in firms in 
which official bargaining does not take place15, that is in firms in which unions are not 
recognized. To control for potential rent-sharing at the industry-level, I will nevertheless 
include in the firm’s covariates Zj detailed industry indicators. I will also provide empirical 
evidence consistent with the fact that there is no rent-sharing in non-unionized firms in the 
next section of this paper.  
When unions are present in a firm, each worker’s wage Uijw  is the result of a Nash 
bargaining between the employer and the workers. Each worker’s outside option in the 
bargaining is the market wage she could get in a non-union firm. The firm threat point is zero 
profit. Let us denote by ∑
∈
=
ji
m
ij
m
j ww  the threat point of firm j workers taken as a whole and 
∑
∈
=
ji
U
ij
U
j ww the total wage bill in firm j. The bargaining consists in maximizing the product 
of the employer and the workers surplus respective to their threat points: 
                                                 
15 More precisely, he shows that 50% of quasi-rents are captured by workers in firms with official bargaining on 
wages and employment, whereas in firms with no official bargaining or official bargaining on wages only, there 
is no rent-sharing.  
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ϕϕ −−−= 1))(()max( UjjmjUjUj wLpFwwArgw                                                                      (3) 
where Lj is firm j labor force and F(Lj) is its production function, while p is a revenue shifter. 
U
jj wLpF −)(  are firm j profits. φ is the union bargaining power. The goal of this paper is not 
to make a detailed analysis of the various bargaining models, since it has already been done 
extensively in the literature (Abowd and Lemieux 1993; Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey 
1996; Kramarz 2008). Yet some clarification is necessary. In the strongly efficient bargaining 
model (Brown and Ashenfelter 1986), the union and the firm bargain both on wages and on 
employment. In the weakly efficient bargaining model16, the firm and the union bargain over 
wages only, while the firm unilaterally sets employment to its profit-maximizing level given 
the negotiated wage rate. Since it does not set out the arguments of the maximization, 
equation (3) is compatible with these 2 models. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) show that in the 
2 models cited above, the solution of equation (3) is    
jjj
m
j
U
j LQRww φ+=                                                                                                         (4) 
where jφ  is equal to jϕ in the strongly efficient bargaining model and to a positive fraction of 
jϕ  in the weakly efficient bargaining model. LwLpFQR mjj /))(( −=  are the quasi-rents per 
worker in firm j and represent the profit per worker the firm would make if all the workers 
were paid their market wage. Equation (4) gives the share of quasi-rents going to the 
workforce. To know what each worker gets individually, it is necessary to make an 
assumption on how the union splits the bargained surplus between the firm workers. I make 
the usual assumption that the union is egalitarian and splits the surplus equally between all the 
workers. Under this assumption, equation (4) can be rewritten at the individual level: 
jj
m
ij
U
ij QRww φ+=                                                                                                               (4’) 
This simply means that the wage of worker i in firm j is equal to her individual market wage 
plus a share of the bargained surplus which is equal for all workers in firm j. Taking the log of 
equation (4’), we obtain )1log()log()log( mijjj
m
ij
U
ij wQRww φ++= . Since firms’ quasi-rents 
QRj are usually small relative to their total labor cost and since the workers bargaining power 
jφ rarely exceed 0.5 (Kramarz 2008), we can work with first order terms: 
m
ijjj
m
ij
U
ij wQRww φ+= )log()log(                                                                                       (5) 
                                                 
16 This model is a version of the right-to-manage model or labor demand model (dating back to Dunlop, 1966) 
which includes bargaining on wages in the first step of the model rather than unilateral setting of the wage level 
by the union. 
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Substituting mijw  by its expression in equation (2) and denoting by Uj an indicator equal to 1 
when unions are present in firm j, we finally get a general wage equation for both workers in 
union and non-union establishments:  
ij
m
ijjjjiij wQRUXw εφγβ +++= )(Z)log( j                                                                        (6) 
Equation (6) leads to 3 predictions for the wage premium mijjj wQRφ associated with firm-
level union recognition: 
Prediction 1: the greater the firm quasi-rents, the larger the union wage premium. 
Prediction 2: the larger the union bargaining power, the larger the union wage premium. 
Prediction 3: the larger a worker’s (market) wage, the smaller his log-wage premium. 
Predictions 1 and 2 directly come from the Nash bargaining framework. The idea is to use the 
large amount of information available in the REPONSE04 dataset to provide reasonable 
proxy variables for the firms’ quasi-rents and union bargaining power and to empirically test 
these predictions. Prediction 3 however comes from an additional hypothesis on the objective 
function of unions: if unions are egalitarians, they split the bargained surplus equally between 
workers and thus, the larger a worker wage, the smaller the share of this fixed bargained wage 
premium in his total compensation. Prediction 3 leads to study the impact of unions on the 
intra-firm structure of wages. As this prediction is not a key feature of the bargaining model 
and can less arguably be used to prove that bargaining is indeed at play, I only test it in 
appendix B by running quantile regressions on the large sample dataset ESS02.  
 
Firms’ rents, workers’ bargaining power and the union wage premium 
 
I first introduce the 2 proxy variables I uses for firms’ quasi-rents and workers’ 
bargaining power and test predictions 1 and 2 separately. A full estimation of equation (6) and 
a discussion of selection issues will follow in the next section.  
According to prediction 1, if union wage premiums are due to bargaining, the larger a 
firm’s quasi-rents, the larger these premiums. The ex ante quasi-rents on which the bargaining 
really occurs are not observable. What is observable in the data is the ex post result of the 
bargaining (accounting wages and profits). To recover a measure of quasi-rents, authors like 
Abowd and Lemieux (1993) or Kramarz (2008) have used an estimated market wage for each 
worker (rather than their actual wage) to compute the ex ante profits on which the bargaining 
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occurs. Since this measure of quasi-rents remains highly endogenous17, these authors also 
instrument it using measures of foreign competition shocks. An alternative strategy proposed 
by Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) is to use past profits at the industry level rather 
than current profits18.  
In this paper, I follow a more direct strategy and use a new and simple indicator of the 
existence of potential rents at the establishment level. This indicator is the establishment’s 
market share as declared by its manager19. In the REPONSE04 survey, managers are asked if 
the market share of their establishment is lower than 3%, between 3% and 25%, between 25% 
and 50% or larger than 50%. Table 4 (first and second rows) shows the distribution of this 
subjective market share variable across the 1861 REPONSE04 establishments for which it is 
available. The establishments’ market share is a direct measure of their market power, that is 
of their ability to raise unilaterally their sales price and profit margin. It is consequently a 
good measure of the ex ante potential rents firms can get in their industry, relative to their 
competitors. Of course, a firm’s market share depends in the long run on its performance and 
might be correlated to the quality of its employees. But the market share varies little and is not 
affected in the short run by variations of wages, contrary to profits that are mechanically 
correlated to wages. Hence the use of the market share avoids some of the endogeneity 
problems emerging when using measures of quasi-rents derived from accounting data which 
in fact represent the ex post result of a potential bargaining.  
Firms’ market shares and labor costs are far less volatile and sensitive to economic 
shocks than profits or sales. The market share can be viewed as an indicator of the long-run 
firm health. We know from the theory of implicit contracts (Azariadis, 1975) that firms insure 
their workers against economic fluctuations (Guiso et al, 2005). This makes wages rigid in the 
short run and implies that the short-term relationship between current profit flows and current 
wages is a weakened measure of the total quantity of rent-sharing within firms. Indeed, if the 
bargaining occurs in the long run (as in a repeated game), the workers will want to exchange 
wage insurance in bad years against less rent sharing in good ones. In other words, the degree 
of rent-sharing in a given year might depend on the firm performance in the previous years. 
For this reason, studies that try to link directly profits to wages also have to deal with delicate 
                                                 
17 Profits or alternative measures of quasi-rents derived from accounting variables such as sales can be 
endogenous in many respects. For example, in the efficiency wage theory (Akerlof and Yellen 1986), higher 
wages lead to higher profits rather than the contrary, leading to reverse causality in wage-profit regressions.   
18 There are also several papers that simply link current wages to current profits. See Fakhfakha and FitzRoyb 
(2002) for an example on French data and a review of the literature. 
19 The use of such a market share indicator is actually not completely new if we consider a broader strand of the 
literature: see Araï, Ballot and Skalli (1996) who used a similar variable in a different context.  
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framing problems (see Abowd and Lemieux 1993) and need to make assumptions on which 
profits are bargained in a given year (previous year profits, current profits, average past 
profits, etc). However, the use of the market share as an indicator of firms’ potential rents 
captures the long-term firms’ capacity to raise wages and avoids these delicate framing 
problems as well as biased relationships between wages and profits that can appear in the 
short run.   
A common problem with objective measures of market share is that they require 
specifying the geographic units and industries to which firms belong. Indeed an objective 
measure of a firm market share is generally obtained by dividing its sales by the total sales in 
its industry and country. But some firms are not directly in competition with all other firms in 
their industry. More problematic, depending on their activity, firms operate at very different 
geographic scales. As proof of this, table 4 (last 2 rows) provides a distribution of the firms in 
the sample according to their declared targeted market. Only 24% of establishments operate 
on the national market. For them the standard market share indicators computed at the 
national level would really include the true competitors. For the remaining 76% of firms, 
these standard market-share indicators are inaccurate measures of the real competitive 
pressure that firms face. The subjective measure I use is not subject to these drawbacks since 
the interviewed managers should easily evaluate the real size of their market. Finally, my 
approach uses a measure of each establishment market share rather than the broader measure 
of industry concentration used in other studies (Blanchflower 1986). Since the degree of 
concentration of an industry is not informative of the relative market power of each particular 
firm in this industry, it seems inappropriate for the within-industry comparison of unionized 
and non-unionized firms I attempt in this paper.  
The first 2 models of table 5 test the relationship between the market share and the 
union wage premium using the REPONSE04 data20. Model (1) uses the same workers and 
establishment control variables as Card and De la Rica (2006) in their study of Spain and 
model (2) adds more detailed controls for workers’ age and tenure and establishment age, as 
well as detailed industry dummies. The establishment market share (grouped in 4 categories), 
union recognition and their interaction are the variables of interest in these models. A higher 
market share in the absence of unions is associated with lower wages in both models. A 
possible explanation for this is that firms with a high market share are also monopsonies in 
their industry. They employ specialized workers that have no or little outside options in other 
                                                 
20 Descriptive statistics on REPONSE04 variables are available in appendix A and estimations of the union wage 
premium with various sets of control variables are presented in table A3 in appendix A. 
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industries and in the other firms of the same industry. These workers are paid less as a 
consequence of this when unions are not present to defend them and bargain over the rents 
available in those firms. Union recognition in low market share establishments is associated 
with lower wages in both models but the estimates are imprecise and are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This is consistent with the idea that in firms facing 
important competitive pressures (those with low market share), there are no rents for unions to 
bargain over. If any, wage increases obtained by unions in these firms should rise production 
costs above their competitive level and drive the firms out of the market, making them 
invisible in our data sample. Finally, the interaction between union recognition and market 
share is estimated to increase wages by about 2.5% in both models, in accordance with 
prediction 1. This effect is robust in model 2 to the inclusion of detailed industry fixed effects 
(161 dummy variables). The idea in model 2 is to identify the union effect based on intra-
industry comparison of establishments with various market shares and union-recognition 
status.  This is superior to model (1) since unions are historically better implanted in specific 
industries (such as manufacturing) and the average level of wages varies a lot across 
industries (Krueger and Summers, 1988) as well as the average degree of concentration. 
Nevertheless, since the REPONSE04 sample is relatively small, it makes sense to test the 
model’s predictions using also the less demanding specification of regression model (1) which 
includes fewer covariates.  
Models (1) and (2) in table 5 impose a linear increase of the union wage premium with 
the market share variable21. This assumption is relaxed in figure 2 which plots the union wage 
premium in each market share group, conditional on the detailed set of covariates included in 
model (2) of table 5. The union wage gap varies almost linearly between a non statistically 
significant -3% gap among the establishments declaring a market share smaller than 5% and a 
highly significant gap of 7.5% among the establishments declaring a market share larger than 
50%. The difference between the union wage gaps in these 2 groups is thus 10.5%. Fischer’s 
test of equality of the estimated union wage gaps in the first and last market share groups has 
a p-value of 0.003, implying that the union wage gap is almost surely larger among the firms 
with a large market share. 
 The proxy variable I use for unions’ bargaining power is the percentage of unionized 
workers in the establishment. France is a country of “open-shop” unionism and workers do 
                                                 
21 Remember that the market share variable is categorical. The fact that the union wage premium is linear with 
the market share variable does not mean that it is linear with the numerical value of the market share, which is 
actually not the case (see figure 2).  
18 
 
not have to be union members when a union is recognized in a firm even though union 
contracts legally cover all the workers. As a consequence, the percentage of unionized 
workers provides a direct indicator of the number of workers that supports the union(s) 
recognized in their establishment. Unions have more credibility to bargain and threat strikes if 
they are supported by a large number of workers. In this respect, the percentage of unionized 
workers is a good indicator of the unions’ bargaining power. The percentage of unionized 
workers as declared by the establishments’ managers has been bracketed in a 5-values 
variable. This variable is described in table 422.  
 The relationship between the unionization rate and the union wage premium is tested 
in models (3) and (4) of table 5. The set of control variables in these models is identical to 
those used in models (1) and (2). In both models (3) and (4), the interaction between union 
recognition and the unionization rate has a significant impact on the hourly wage, in 
accordance with prediction 2. Union recognition alone or having a high unionization rate 
without unions does not affect wages. This is an indication of the validity of the assumption 
made in the bargaining model that no bargaining occurs in firms where unions are not present. 
Indeed, if bargaining also takes place in non unionized workplace, we should probably 
observe a wage premium in non-unionized establishments having a lot of unionized workers. 
The right panel of figure 2 displays the estimated union wage gap in each unionization rate 
group. The union wage gap increases from virtually 0 in the group of establishments with less 
than 1% of unionized workers up to 12% among establishments having more than 10% of 
unionized workers. Fischer’s test of equality of the estimated union wage gaps in the first and 
last unionization rate groups has a p-value of 0.012, implying that the union wage gap is 
larger among the firms with a large unionization rate at the conventional 5% statistical level.  
 
Estimation of the full bargaining model 
  
 I now turn to the structural estimation of a standard bargaining model with proxy 
variables for both quasi-rents and workers’ bargaining power. Consistent with the assumption 
                                                 
22 Note that only 34% of establishments where unions are recognized have more than 10% of unionized workers. 
The average unionization rate in establishments where unions are recognized is in fact very low (simple 
calculation from national statistics shows that it is less than 20%) and far lower than in US where 92% of the 
covered workers are unionized (Eren, 2009).  
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that there is no rent-sharing in workplaces where unions are not present23, I define workers’ 
bargaining power jψ  by jjj U ϕψ = . Equation (6) can then be rewritten:  
ij
m
ijjjiij wQRXw εψγβ +++= jZ)log(                                                                              (6’) 
To avoid the presence of the individual market wage mijw that comes in the right hand-side of 
the log-wage regression when we suppose that the union is egalitarian, a wage equation 
similar to equation (6’) can also be estimated24:  
'
j 'Z' ijjjiij QRXw εψγβ +++=                                                                                            (6’’) 
I estimate equations (6’) and (6’’) derived from the bargaining model using two sets of proxy 
variables for quasi-rents and bargaining power. My first approach is to summarize the four-
category market share variable in a “High Market Share” dummy variable (HMS) equal to 1 
for establishments with a market share higher than 50% and 0 otherwise. I then postulate a 
linear relationship between quasi-rents and this high market share variable:  
jjj baHMSQR µ++=                                                                                                           (8) 
with 0>a  and 0][ =Ε jj HMSµ . The advantage of using a dummy variable rather than the 
four-category market share variable is that the linear relationship above can be supposed 
without loss of generality. The inconvenience is that the way to aggregate the market share 
categories is somehow arbitrary. I have chosen to isolate the establishments with a market 
share higher than 50% because the union wage gaps in figure 2 are clearly larger among this 
group.  
Similarly, in figure 2, the union wage premium jumps up among the groups of 
establishments with a unionization rate above 10%. I thus approximate the workers’ 
bargaining power by an indicator of High Bargaining Power (HBP) equal to 1 for unionized 
establishments having more than 10% of unionized workers: 
jjj dcHBP ηψ ++=                                                                                                               (9) 
with 0>c  and 0][ =Ε jj HBPη . Using equations (8) and (9), the wage equation (6’’) can be 
rewritten: 
'
4321jZ ijjjjjiij HBPHMSHBPHMSXw εααααγβ ++++++=                                   (10) 
                                                 
23 This result has been proven by Kramarz (2010). The fact that the unionization rate alone does not lead to 
higher wages (table 5, columns 3 and 4) also confirms it. Finally, this assumption is also consistent with the 
French legal settings that make actual bargaining legal only when unions are recognized.  
24 Equation (6’’) is derived from equations (4’) considering that 'j 'Z' iji
m
ij Xw εγβ ++= . 
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with acbcad === 321 ,, ααα  and bd=4α . Equation 10 is estimated in models (1) and (2) 
of table 6 using 2 different sets of covariates. In the most precise specification (model 2), the 
estimate of 3α  is statistically significant at the 5% level and equal to 1.78. 1α  is estimated to 
be significantly negative whereas 2α  is virtually equal to 0. The negative estimate of 
1α would imply that d is negative, which would in turn lead to suppose from equation (9) that 
the true workers’ bargaining power jψ is on average negative in establishments where 
jHBP is equal to 0. Since this bargaining power parameter is derived from a Nash-bargaining, 
it should be bounded between 0 and 1. In this respect, the negative estimate of 1α is puzzling. 
However, it can be explained if the establishments’ market share also affects wages in the 
absence of collective bargaining. This happens for example if high market share 
establishments act as monopsonies and hire a specialized workforce that cannot easily find a 
job in another firm. In this case, the market share should also enter in the set of covariates 
jZ that affect the market wage and 1α  is no longer identifiable25. Finally, the difference in 
hourly wage between high market share and high bargaining power establishments in those 
with only a high market share is 1.75€, which is about 13% of the mean wage in the sample 
(12.69€). Columns (3) and (4) present the same estimations but using non-aggregated market 
share and bargaining power variables (the non-aggregated bargaining power variable is equal 
to 0 for non-unionized establishments and increases from 1 to 5 according to the percentage of 
unionized workers in establishments in which unions are recognized). The estimated cross-
effect of market share and bargaining power is still positive and statistically significant. 
Finally models (1) to (4) have been reproduced using the log of the hourly wage as a 
dependent variable instead of the hourly wage. In the sixth column for example, the cross-
effect on wages of a high bargaining power and a high market share is estimated to be around 
8%.  
 
Selection issues and robustness of the results 
 
Since predictions 1 and 2 are directly derived from a standard bargaining model, their 
empirical validation reinforces the rent-sharing interpretation of the union wage premium 
obtained by unions. But a selection process can still be at play, for example if the best workers 
                                                 
25 In the same way, 4α is not identifiable since it is confounded with the constant term. 
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select themselves in large unionized firms which have the highest market share. Despite all 
my efforts to control for observable individual characteristics, some unobservable component 
of the individual productivity correlated with the establishments’ union status and market 
share could lead to higher wages. This is unlikely for two reasons. First, the presence of 
unions in French firms relies on the individual willingness of some particular workers to 
accept to become union representatives. The union-status of firms depends more on a few 
individualities than on a global organization process of workers in a common group of 
interests. As a consequence, the union-status of a firm can be expected to be more exogenous 
with respect to the individual characteristics of the non-unionized workers who probably did 
not participate in the firm’s unionization process. The surveyed employees in the 
REPONSE04 dataset are asked if they are unionized. Models (5) and (6) of table 5 reproduce 
the test of predictions 1 and 2 on the subsample of non-unionized workers only. The estimated 
effects on wages of the interaction between union recognition and market share and of the 
interaction between union recognition and unionization rate are only slightly lower than those 
found on the entire sample and significant at conventional statistical levels. Since the proxy I 
use for union bargaining power is the percentage of unionized workers and that unionized 
workers are likely to differ from non-unionized ones, the replication on non-unionized 
workers carried out in model (6) is even more crucial: it shows that the wage premium due to 
a higher bargaining power is similar for the subgroup of workers that induce this higher 
bargaining power than for the workers who legally benefit from the bargaining without being 
actively taking part in it. Overall, models (5) and (6) show that the empirical validation of 
predictions 1 and 2 is not driven by unionized workers that are far more likely to be selected. 
But an unexplainable selection process of the best non-unionized workers in establishments 
with both a high market share and a union recognized can still be at play and explain the 
results in model (5). Similarly, a selection process of the best non-unionized workers in 
establishments with both a high unionization rate and a union recognized can still be at play 
and explain the results in model (6). Since the point estimates for union recognition and 
market share (resp. unionization rate) in model (5) (resp. model 6) are all negative, such a 
selection process needs to take place simultaneously on both variables and cannot be a simple 
combination of two selection processes in establishments where unions are recognized and in 
establishments with a high market share (resp. high unionization rate). Also, if a selection 
process of the best workers is at play, this should show up in the labor productivity of the 
selected establishments. I have thus reproduced the empirical analysis of this paper including 
a linear control for labor productivity (measured as the value added per employee) in all the 
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regression models in order to better capture worker’s unobserved ability. The labor 
productivity variable I use comes from the DIANE dataset which contains publicly-available 
company accounts and that I have matched with the REPONSE04 dataset and is only defined 
at the firm level. Its inclusion in regression models tends in fact to increase both the point 
estimates and the significance of the estimates for the variable of interest of this study, 
suggesting that there is no selection of the best workers into organized establishments with a 
high market share or a high unionization rate26.  
 
 Another potential source of biases is the selection by unions of the firms with the 
highest potential of rent extraction. In this case, the selection does not operate on the 
individual characteristics of the workers but on the characteristics of their working 
establishment. If unions target and organize the establishments with the highest potential 
rents, we should observe a correlation between union recognition and market share. The 
descriptive statistics in table 4 show that the distribution of unionized and non-unionized 
establishments across market share groups are very close. The link between market share and 
union recognition is tested more properly in table 7 which displays the results of 2 
establishment-level logit regressions of union recognition on the market share indicator and a 
range of establishments’ characteristics. In both models, a higher market share is not 
associated with a higher probability of union recognition. The marginal effect for the average 
establishment in the sample of switching from a market share category to the next one 
reported in the third row is close to 1%. This means for example that the differential in the 
probability of union recognition between the establishments with a market share lower than 
5% (first group) and those with a market share larger than 50% (fourth group) is around 3%.  
The market share variable used in this paper is a simple indicator of the presence of 
quasi-rents. If unions select firms, they should do so on the ground of their potential or actual 
rents. The fact that union presence and market share are not correlated does not necessarily 
mean that the unobserved component of quasi-rents jµ  is not correlated with union 
recognition. If such a selection is at play, one could expect that the unionized establishments 
declaring a low market share have in fact a higher jµ than those declaring a high market 
share. This in turn would imply that the estimated relationship between market share and the 
                                                 
26 Results not reported but available on demand. The DIANE dataset is provided by Bureau van Dijk, a private 
consulting company, and it is the French source file for the more famous Amadeus database. The match with 
REPONSE04 leads to a loss of about 500 REPONSE04 establishments, which is a quarter of the REPONSE 
sample. This is the reason why I have not de facto controlled for labor productivity in the regression models. 
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union wage gap plotted in figure 2 is flatter than it should be. In other words, the strategic 
selection of firms by unions according to their quasi-rents can only bias downward our 
estimates.  
 As discussed above, the union status of a firm is more driven by a few individualities 
than by a global organization process of workers. It is thus not surprising to find that the 
union status is not highly correlated with market share. However, the unionization rate 
variable is an aggregate measure of the workers’ willingness to organize and should be more 
largely driven by the amount of rents available. Columns 3 and 4 of table 7 present 
establishment-level ordered-logit regressions of the unionization rate on the market share 
indicator and a range of establishments’ characteristics. In the specification which includes 
detailed covariates and industry dummies (column 4), the effect of market share on the 
unionization rate is statistically significant at the 10% level. The fact that workers bargaining 
power and quasi-rents are positively correlated leads to a positive bias in the previous 
estimations of the link between union wage premiums and market share or unionization rates 
that would tend to make steeper the estimated relationships plotted in table 2. Since such a 
bias derives from a rent-extraction view of unions (there is no sense for a selection process of 
firms regarding their rents if workers cannot expect to bargain these rents), it actually cannot 
be advocated to prove that union wage premiums are not due to rent-extraction.  
 From a theoretical point of view, the parameter that is endogenous to the amount of 
quasi-rents available is the workers’ bargaining power. Consider indeed that workers taken 
collectively have to pay a cost )(ψc to get a bargaining power equal toψ , with )(ψc  a convex 
increasing function. )(ψc is a simple measure of the aggregate cost paid at the establishment-
level by workers to organize. It can for example comprise union dues for unionized workers, 
union work for union representatives and sunk costs invested in the organization process27. In 
a two-step game, the workers should choose in the first step the bargaining power that will 
maximize their surplus in the subsequent bargaining with the employer: 
)(max( jjj
m
jj cQRwArg ψψψ −+=               
The chosen bargaining power simply satisfies jj QRc =′ )(ψ and is an increasing function of 
the expected quasi-rents. I test this link between workers’ bargaining power and quasi-rents 
by estimating a logit regression of the high bargaining power indicator (that combines 
together union recognition and unionization rate) on the establishments’ market share and 
                                                 
27 The standard question of which workers in particular bear this cost and which are free-riders is beyond the 
scope of this paper and is not modeled in the aggregate establishment-level cost )(ψc . 
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other covariates. The results are displayed in columns 5 and 6 of table 7: jumping from a 
market share group to the next has a positive and statistically very significant impact on the 
probability to have high bargaining power. Going from a market share lower than 3% to a 
market share larger than 50% increases the likelihood of the average establishment in the 
sample to have a high bargaining power by about 10%. More generally, the endogeneity of 
the workers’ bargaining power induces an upward bias in studies that attempt to capture the 
average degree of rent-sharing with regressions of individual wages on measures of quasi-
rents (this is potentially the case for the studies by Abowd and Lemieux 1993, Abowd and 
Allain 1995, Blanchflower et al 1996 and Kramarz 2008).   
A last alternative to the rent-sharing explanation of the union wage premium is the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. If workers can move with no cost from the non-
unionized to the unionized sector, market forces should make them indifferent in equilibrium 
between working in one or the other of these two sectors. In this case, the wage premium 
obtained by unions should be compensated by losses on non-wage aspects of workers’ 
compensation such as working effort, working conditions or job protection. If unions’ 
objective function favors wages at the expense of non-wage aspects of compensation, unions 
could in fact extract monetary rents in firms where they are present and lose on other aspects 
in the same time. The simple bargaining model I use in this paper does not model the non-
wage aspects of workers’ compensation and makes it impossible to sort out between this 
weaker explanation and the pure rent-extraction story that would predict that unions manage 
to make workers better off on all the aspects of their compensation. A key prediction of the 
compensating wage differential theory is that workers should remain at the equilibrium 
indifferent between working in the unionized and the non-unionized sectors. I test this 
prediction in appendix C by looking at voluntary quits in unionized and non-unionized firms. 
I show that the annual rate of voluntary quits is lower by one third in unionized 
establishments, even when I control for workers’ productivity. This is consistent with the idea 
that workers might be better off in these establishments. Furthermore, the quarterly dismissal 
rate is also a bit lower in these establishments, suggesting that job protection is not worse 
when unions are present. These two results suggest that the wage premium obtained by unions 
is not compensated by losses on other aspects, contrary to what is predicted by the theory of 
compensating wage differentials28 .  
 
                                                 
28 Looking at workers’ moves and job protection can be computationally intensive. Details on the dataset I use of 
and on my empirical specifications are provided in appendix C.   
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Conclusion 
 
This paper studies the wage premium associated with establishment-level union 
recognition in France. A premium of 2 to 3% is precisely estimated in individual hourly wage 
equations using a large dataset that enables to control for standard observable workers and 
firms characteristics. Despite the reputation of French unions as being strong and the fact that 
the system of French industrial relations is to a large extent decentralized, this premium is far 
lower that what is found in the literature with similar techniques for other countries (Card and 
De La Rica, 2006). I suggest that this is due to the weak legal barriers to firm-level union 
recognition in France, which explains both that unions are recognized in a large number of 
firms but with a low bargaining power on average in these firms. 
This paper then pushes the analysis further and investigates whether the union wage 
premium in France is due to rent-extraction. If this is the case, the premium should be 
increasing with the amount of rents available in firms and with the bargaining power of 
unions. I derive these two predictions from a simple bargaining model and test it using two 
proxy variables for the existence of potential rents and the unions’ bargaining power. 
Empirical results show that the union wage premium increases from virtually 0 to 8% to 12% 
in firms with high potential rents and when unions have a strong bargaining power. This 
confirms the theoretical predictions of the bargaining framework.  
The paper also contributes to the rent-sharing literature along two lines. First, it shows 
that the workers’ bargaining power is likely to increase with the amount of rents they can get. 
This implies that usual estimates of this rent-sharing parameter based on regressions of the 
individual wage on measures of quasi-rents might be partially biased. Second, it is the first in 
the literature to estimate a bargaining model with proxy variables for both quasi-rents and for 
the workers’ bargaining power.  
Finally, the union wage premium I find in firms with high potential rents is in line 
with what is usually found in the international literature for all firms. This suggests that in 
countries where the cost of organizing is higher than in France, unions organize a smaller 
number of firms and target only those in which the amount of rents they can extract will lead 
to a wage premium that is sufficient to compensate this higher shadow cost to organize the 
firm. Further research would enable to link more precisely the legal cost paid by unions to 
organize to the wage premium they obtain in each country. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the branches hourly minimum wages in 2007. 
 
Notes: The hourly national minimum wage in the 1st of July 2007 was equal to 8.44€. Source: Author’s 
computations from the Collective Bargaining annual book (2006). Only the 160 branches covering 
more than 5,000 workers are represented. They cover 10 million workers, which is more than one half 
of the private sector total employment.   
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the workplaces with more than 20 employees in terms of the total number of 
unions present 
Number of unions 
present in a workplace 
Proportion of workplaces in 
the REPONSE data 
Proportion of French 
workplaces concerned 
Proportion of French 
workers concerned  
0 33.90% 64.34% 36.03% 
1 18.09% 19.32% 19.04% 
2 13.29% 7.60% 13.07% 
3 12.16% 3.73% 10.44% 
4 9.98% 2.60% 8.37% 
5 9.38% 1.98% 8.78% 
6 2.36% 0.27% 3.34% 
more than 6 0.83% 0.17% 0.94% 
Note:. From Author’s computation using the REPONSE dataset and the set of weights provided by the 
ministry of Labor to make the data sample representative of the French private sector workplaces with 
more than 20 employees or of the workers in those workplaces. 
 
 
Table 1. Description of French main unions: 
French union Historical/ Ideological roots 
Representation  
(in 2004) 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) Marxism 27.6% 
Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) Socialism 27.3% 
Force Ouvrière (FO) Trotskyism 19.7% 
Confédération Générale des Cadres (CGC) white collars 11.3% 
Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC) Christians 10.5% 
Others (these are generally local or sector specific unions)  3.5% 
Notes: The last column gives the distribution of all the union delegates among establishments with 
more than 20 employees in 2004 (obtained from the REPONSE dataset using a weighted average of 
the number of union delegates in each workplace). 
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Table 3. Log Hourly Wage Regressions (ESS02) 
                                                                Dependent variable: log of gross hourly wage (from ESS02) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Workplace Union Recognition 0.201 0.0272 0.0173    
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)    
Firm Wage Contract    0.073 -0.006 -0.007 
    (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) 
Worker's characteristics 
Women  -0.132 -0.133  -0.133 -0.136 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005) 
High School  0.097 0.099  0.099 0.101 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Some College  0.136 0.139  0.141 0.143 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) 
College or University Degree  0.268 0.277  0.274 0.282 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Age (in years)  0.011 detailed  0.012 detailed 
  (0.0001)   (0.0002)  
Fixed Term Contract  -0.055 -0.021  -0.052 -0.017 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.012) 
Firm's characteristics (reference:workplaces with 10 to 20 workers) 
20-50 Workers  0.030 0.024  0.018 0.013 
  (0.006) (0.026)  (0.009) (0.009) 
51-100 Workers  0.036 0.028  0.032 0.024 
  (0.007) (0.026)  (0.010) (0.009) 
101-200 Workers  0.050 0.043  0.056 0.047 
  (0.007) (0.026)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Over 200 Workers  0.075 0.067  0.083 0.075 
  (0.007) (0.026)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Intercept 2.63 2.71 2.87 2.73 2.69 2.86 
  (0.005) (0.023) (0.027)  (0.012) (0.037) (0.020) 
Industries No 1 digit 2 digits No 1 digit 2 digits 
Observations 106,734 97,751 97,751 70,987 64,987 64,987 
R-squared 0.034 0.625 0.636  0.000 0.626 0.637 
Notes: All models except (1) and (4) also include 10 indicators for region and 4 indicators for 
occupation. Standard errors are calculated with clustering by establishments in models (1) to (3) and 
by firms in models (4) to (6). Models (2) and (5) include 9 indicators for industry. Models (3) and (6) 
include 47 indicators for industry as well as 10 indicators for worker's age and 4 indicators for worker 
tenure. 
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Table 4. Distribution of establishments in terms of their declared market share, targeted market and 
percentage of unionized workers (REPONSE04) 
Market Share (MS) MS<3% 3%<MS<25% 25%<MS<50% MS>50%   Total 
Number of establishments 318 787 451 305  1861 
(percentage) (17%) (42%) (24%) (18%)  (100%)
Nb. of non-unionized estab. 146 257 137 109  649 
(percentage) (22%) (40%) (21%) (17%)  (100%)
Nb. of unionized estab. 172 530 314 196  1212 
(percentage) (14%) (44%) (26%) (16%)  (100%)
Targeted market Local Regional National  European International Total 
Number of establishments 477 416 576 305 666 2440 
(percentage) (20%) (17%) (24%) (12%) (27%) (100%)
Unionization Rate (UR) UR<1% 1%<UR<5% 5%<UR<10% UR>10%  Total 
Number of establishments 493 560 595 481  2129 
(percentage) (23%) (26%) (28%) (23%)  (100%)
Nb. of non-unionized estab. 473 190 72 18  753 
(percentage) (63%) (25%) (9.6%) (2.4%)  (100%)
Nb. of unionized estab. 20 370 523 463  1376 
(percentage) (1.45%) (27%) (38%) (34%)  (100%)
 
 
   
Table 5. Log Hourly Wage Regressions: Union recognition, bargaining power and rents (REPONSE04) 
  All surveyed workers   Non-unionized only
   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Union Recognition (establishment level)  -0.028 -0.046 -0.025 -0.018   -0.039 -0.014 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.032) (0.020) 
Market share (4 groups)  -0.018 -0.022    -0.024  
  (0.008) (0.008)    (0.008)  
Union Recognition*Market share  0.027 0.028    0.025  
  (0.011) (0.011)    (0.011)  
Unionization Rate (5 groups)    -0.010 -0.012   -0.009 
    (0.010) (0.009)   (0.010) 
Union Recognition*Unionization rate    0.029 0.024   0.020 
    (0.012) (0.011)   (0.012) 
Workers controls:         
Gender, educ., age, occup., full time   Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Detailed age and tenure  No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
Establishment controls: Size, Region  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Establishment controls: Age  No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
Establishment controls: Industries  1 digit 3 digits 1 digit 3 digits  3 digits 3 digits 
Observations  4990 4934 5612 5547  4310 4841 
R-squared  0.641 0.711 0.640 0.714  0.695 0.725 
Notes: In all models, union recognition, market share and unionization rate are defined at the 
establishment level and standard errors are calculated with clustering by establishments. The control 
variables used are those in columns (2) and (3) of table A3. Models (5) and (6) are estimated on the 
subsample of non-unionized workers.  
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Figure 2. The union wage gap in each market share and unionization rate group (controlling 
for other observable characteristics) 
 
Notes: The union wage gaps in both graphs are obtained by running 2 regressions of the individual 
hourly wage from DADS03 on detailed observable individual characteristics (gender, age tenure, 
education, occupation, full-time job) and establishment characteristics (size, region, firm age, 3-digit 
industries) and a set of 4 indicators for market share groups (left graph) or 5 indicators for 
unionization rate group (right graph) as well as the interaction of these indicators with a union 
recognition dummy. The plotted point estimates and 95% confidence intervals correspond to the 
estimated effect of these interactions on hourly wages. The point estimates should be interpreted as the 
union wage premium within each market share or unionization rate group, conditional on other 
observable workers and establishment characteristics.  
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Table 6.  Estimation of structural wage and log-wage equations with proxy variables for quasi-rents and 
bargaining power (REPONSE04) 
Dependent variable: Net hourly wage   Log of Net hourly wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
High Market Share (HMS) -0.57 -0.73   -0.031 -0.039   
 (0.24) (0.26)   (0.015) (0.015)   
High Bargaining Power (HBP) -0.02 -0.03   0.023 0.013   
 (0.25) (0.22)   (0.014) (0.013)   
HMS*HBP 1.42 1.78   0.067 0.083   
 (0.85) (0.87)   (0.039) (0.037)   
Market Share (MS, 4 groups)   -0.36 -0.48   -0.019 -0.022 
   (0.17) (0.18)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Bargaining Power (BP, 5 groups)   -0.30 -0.43   -0.004 -0.009 
   (0.24) (0.25)   (0.009) (0.009) 
MS*BP   0.13 0.18   0.007 0.007 
Workers controls:   
(0.07) (0.08)   (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender educ. age occup. full time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Detailed age and tenure No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Establishment controls: Size Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls: Age No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industries 
Observations 
1 digit
4430 
3 digits
4386 
1 digit
4430 
3 digits
4386  
1 digit 
4430 
3 digits 
4386 
1 digit 
4430 
3 digits 
4386 
R-squared 0.393 0.425 0.393 0.425  0.633 0.684 0.633 0.684 
Notes: In all models, standard errors are calculated with clustering by establishments. The high market share 
variable is a dummy equal to 1 for establishments declaring a market share larger than 50%. The high 
bargaining power variable is a dummy equal to 1 for establishments where unions are recognized and with 
more than 10% unionized workers. The bargaining power variables is equal to 0 for establishments in which 
unions are not recognized and varies from 1 to 5 according to the proportion of unionized workers for 
establishments in which they are recognized.  
 
 
Table 7.  Establishment-level regressions: Are Union recognition and bargaining power explained by rents? 
(REPONSE04) 
Dependent variable:  Union Recognition   Unionization Rate   High Bargaining Power 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Market share (4 groups) 0.051 0.059 0.104 0.095  0.183 0.195 
(robust standard error) (0.065) (0.072) (0.049) (0.054)  (0.066) (0.076) 
Marginal effect at the mean 0.010 0.013  - -   0.028 0.030 
Establishment controls:         
Size and region Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Age No Yes No Yes  No Yes 
Industries 1 digit 3 digits 1 digit 3 digits  3 digits 3 digits 
Regression Model* Logit Logit Ologit Ologit  Logit Logit 
Observations 1860 1591 1647 1644  1639 1466 
Pseudo R-squared 0.365 0.367 0.113 0.160  0.126 0.182 
Notes: The market share variable takes values 1 to 4. The high bargaining power variable used in the last 2 
columns is a dummy equal to 1 for establishments where unions are recognized and with more than 10% 
unionized workers. The control variables used are those in columns (2) and (3) of table A3.  
* "Ologit" means "ordered logit" model.  
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Appendix A: Description of ESS02 and REPONSE04 variables 
 
Table A1. Means of individual and establishment-level variables in ESS02 
Individual variables: 
Whole Sample     
(97,751 
individuals) 
Unionized 
Establishments      
(57,435 individuals) 
 
Non-Unionized 
Establishments     
(43,316 individuals)
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
         
Gross hourly wage (€) 15.09 9.26 16.14 9.56  13.75 8.67 
Women 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47  0.37 0.48 
Age 39.15 10.51 40.21 10.32  37.79 10.60 
Tenure 11.32 10.25 13.48 10.89  8.53 8.59 
Long-term contract 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.24  0.93 0.26 
Education:        
       Less than high school 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49  0.61 0.49 
       High school degree 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37  0.17 0.38 
       Some College 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34  0.13 0.34 
       College or University Degree 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33  0.09 0.28 
Occupation:        
       Blue Collar  0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49  0.40 0.49 
       Clerk  0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38  0.24 0.43 
       Supervisor or Technician 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43  0.22 0.41 
       Manager 0.17 0.37  0.18 0.39   0.14 0.35 
Establishment variables: Whole Sample     (10,741 estab.) 
Unionized 
Establishments  
(5,659 estab.) 
 
Non-Unionized 
Establishments      
(5,082 estab.) 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Union recognition 0.22 0.41 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Size 59.07 1496.43  179.57 3047.14   25.84 540.11 
Notes:  Individual  (resp.  establishment)  variables  are  weighted  by  ESS02  workers  (resp. 
establishments) sampling weights.  
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Table A2. Means of individual and establishment-level variables in REPONSE04 
Individual variables: 
Whole Sample     
(6,629 
individuals) 
Unionized 
Establishments      
(4,459 individuals) 
 
Non-Unionized 
Establishments     
(2,152 individuals) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Net hourly wage (€) 12.60 8.23 13.36 8.01  11.18 8.47 
Women 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48  0.41 0.49 
Age 39.95 9.80 40.65 9.73  38.65 9.83 
Tenure 11.77 10.17 13.25 10.58  9.01 8.75 
Full-time worker  0.90 0.29 0.91 0.29  0.89 0.31 
Education:        
         Less than high school 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50  0.60 0.49 
         High school degree 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34  0.14 0.35 
         Some College 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36  0.14 0.35 
         College or University Degree 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37  0.12 0.32 
Occupation:        
         Blue Collar  0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48  0.36 0.48 
         Clerk  0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35  0.22 0.41 
         Supervisor or Technician 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.45  0.26 0.44 
         Manager 0.20 0.40  0.22 0.42   0.16 0.37 
Establishment variables: Whole Sample     (2,451 estab.) 
Unionized 
Establishments  
(1,612 estab.) 
 
Non-Unionized 
Establishments     
(839 estab.) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
        
Union recognition 0.36 0.48 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Size 77.24 172.20 134.16 270.37  45.29 39.37 
Establishment Age:        
           less than 5 years 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21  0.04 0.20 
           5 to 9 years 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27  0.11 0.31 
           10 to 19 years 0.28 0.45 0.26 0.44  0.29 0.45 
           20 to 49 years 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49  0.41 0.49 
           50 years or more 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42  0.15 0.36 
ICT use  7.19 3.44 7.65 3.20  6.95 3.55 
Managerial practices  4.65 1.60 5.03 1.47  4.43 1.63 
Belong to a listed firm 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15  0.01 0.11 
Belong to a family Firm 0.59 0.49  0.42 0.49   0.69 0.46 
Notes: Individual (resp. establishment) variables are weighted by ESS02 workers (resp. 
establishments) sampling weights. ICT use and managerial practices are aggregated indexes.  
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Table A3. Log Hourly Wage Regressions (REPONSE04)  
  Dependent variable: log of net hourly wage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Workplace Union Recognition 0.191 0.031 0.019 0.018 0.021 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Worker's characteristics  
Women  -0.139 -0.134 -0.135 -0.145 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
High School  0.056 0.056 0.048 0.054 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Some College  0.111 0.111 0.108 0.115 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
College or University Degree  0.222 0.235 0.224 0.219 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) 
Age  0.011 detailed detailed detailed 
  (0.000)    
Full time  0.068 0.051 0.038 0.027 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Firm's characteristics                                                                                                               
(reference in (5): workplaces with 20 to 50 workers, not intensive in ICT, not family and not listed) 
51-100 Workers  0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
101-200 Workers  0.028 0.030 0.028 0.006 
  (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
Over 200 Workers  0.074 0.060 0.064 0.049 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) 
ICT use     0.009 
     (0.002) 
Managerial practices     0.007 
     (0.004) 
Listed     0.081 
     (0.035) 
Family firm     -0.023 
     (0.011) 
Intercept 2.300 2.365 2.495 2.475 2.385 
 (0.013) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.054) 
Industries No 1 digit 2 digits 3 digits 4 digits 
Observations 6610 6449 6357 6357 4990 
R-squared 0.042 0.628 0.656 0.678 0.709 
Notes: All models except (1) also include 10 indicators for region and 4 indicators for occupation. 
Standard errors are calculated with clustering by establishments in all models. Model (2) includes 14 
indicators for industry. Model (3), (4) and (5) include 10 indicators for worker's age, 4 indicators for 
worker's tenure and 5 indicators for firm's age. Models (3), (4) and (5) include respectively 51, 168 
and 328 indicators for industry.  
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Tables A1 and A2 show that workers in unionized establishments are less often 
women and are older with a longer tenure. The education and occupation profiles of workers 
in unionized and non-unionized establishments are close with only slightly less clerks in 
unionized establishments. Unionized workplaces are a lot larger. Table A2 shows that they are 
also older and more intensive in ICT. Finally, they have more innovative managerial practices 
and belong to a family less often.  
Models (1), (2) and (3) of table A3 obtained with REPONSE04 are equivalent to 
models (1), (2) and (3) of table 3 obtained with ESS02 with the exception that the type of 
working contract is not observable in REPONSE04 and has been replace by a dummy 
variable for full time workers (which is observable only in REPONSE04). The estimated 
wage premium associated with union recognition is very close in both tables. Standard errors 
for all coefficients in table A3 are about twice larger than those in table 3. This is coherent 
with the fact that there are around 3000 establishments of firms in REPONSE and around 
13000 in ESS02 (since standard errors decrease with the square root of the number of 
observations, a multiplication by 4 of the sample size indeed corresponds to a division by 2 of 
the estimated standard errors) but renders the estimated effect of the union wage premium 
insignificant at the 5% level in models (3), (4) and (5).  
 Model (4) of table A3 uses 4-digit instead of 3-digit industry controls. Model (5) uses 
the large amount of information available in REPONSE04 to control for other firm 
characteristics. First, unions play a role in their firm’s decision to invest in Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT). An indicator of ICT intensity similar to the one used by 
Bassanini et al (2010) has thus been added in the regression model. Unions also influence 
management practices (being against performance pay for example). For this reason, an 
indicator of so-called modern management practices has been included in the model. Finally, I 
also include 2 control variables for listed and family firms since unions are known to be more 
present in large listed firms that offer larger wages and less present in family firms that offer 
lower wages (Muller Philipon 2006, Sraer Thesmar 2007).  
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Appendix B: Unions and the structure of wages (test of prediction 3). 
 
The more concise way to test prediction 3 (the larger a worker’s wage, the smaller his log-
wage premium) is probably to use quantile regression models. This is done in figure B1 which 
shows how union recognition shifts each quantile of the overall wage distribution, conditional 
on other observable variables. Coherent with prediction 3, the union wage premium decreases 
along the wage distribution. Union recognition is associated with an increase of the 3 first 
deciles of the wage distribution by roughly 2.5% whereas the shift for the 2 last deciles is only 
around 1.5%. 
 
Figure B1.Quantile estimates of the union wage premium (conditional on other observable variables)  
 Notes. Obtained from a quantile regression that includes the detailed controls in model (3) of table 3. 
The individual controls are 10 workers’ age groups, 4 workers’ tenure groups as well as indicators for 
workers’ gender, education, occupation and an indicator for full-time jobs. The establishment-level 
controls are 5 indicators for establishment size, 10 indicators for regions and 47 indicators for 
industries. 
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Appendix C: Unions, voluntary quits and job protection (test of the absence 
of compensating wage differentials) 
 
I investigate whether unionized firms offer a specific compensation package including more 
job security. In order to do so, I estimate the relationship between workplace-level union 
recognition and different types of separations rates. In my data, separation rates are available 
for each quarter over 2002-2006 whereas union recognition, establishment and firm-level 
controls are available only for year 2004. Some types of separations, including dismissals, 
fluctuate quite a lot over time. Therefore, I estimate them over a rather long time period 
(2002-2006). The model that I estimate is thus: 
jttjj
a
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where ajtS  is the separation rate of type a, in establishment j at quarter t, jU is a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of one or more unions in establishment j, jX  is a vector of 
establishment and firm-level controls and tD  is a time dummy. The various types of 
separations include: dismissals, voluntary quits, retirement, end of trial period and end of 
fixed-term contract.  
I use the DMMO/ EMMO database. The DMMO (Données sur les Mouvements de Main-
d’Oeuvre) has exhaustive data on gross worker flows (hirings and separations, excluding 
workers provided by temporary help supply firms) for establishments with 50 employees or 
more for each quarter. The data is broken down by type of flow. The EMMO (Enquête sur les 
Mouvements de Main-d’Oeuvre) has identical information on a representative sample of 
establishments with less than 50 employees. I match these dataset with REPONSE 2004. The 
match of the two datasets is rather good: after doing it, I obtain 2024 matched establishments 
reporting information on unions. I use the DMMO-EMMO data to compute indicators of job 
security and, more specifically, of separation rates at the establishment level. In order to do 
that, I drop all movements corresponding to job spells shorter than one month. These indeed 
correspond to very short trial periods or temporary contracts which have little to do with job 
security for core workers29. I also exclude movements due to transfers between two 
establishments of the same firm. The data allows to build separation rates for each quarter 
over 2002-200630. As standard in the gross worker flow literature (Davis et al, 2006), 
separation rates are defined as the sum of all types of exits31 divided by average employment. 
In order to go deeper into the types of separations, I define dismissal rates, quit rates, 
retirement rates, rates of end of trial periods and rates of end of fixed-term contracts as the 
ratio of the corresponding type of exit during the quarter to the average employment of the 
quarter.  
Each quarter, the establishments in my sample separate from about 4% of their workers. 
Organized establishments appear to have a lower separation rate than their non-organized 
counterparts (3.6% on average, against 5.3% in non-organized establishments). Each quarter, 
organized establishments dismiss fewer workers (0.47% on average, compared 0.60% in non-
organized establishments) and have more separations due to retirement or end of trial period 
(0.18% and 0.13%, respectively, against 0.13% and 0.08% in non-organized establishments). 
                                                 
29 The results are nonetheless robust to the inclusion of these very short job spells. 
30 Potentially we have information for 20 quarters for each establishment. However, there are several missing 
values and we have complete information for only 750 establishments. The average number of quarters with 
non-missing data per establishment is 16.3. We have non-missing data in at least half of the quarters in 1756 
establishments, while we have less than one fourth of the quarters for 117 establishments. 
31 Exits can be due to dismissals, quits, retirement and early retirement, end of trial periods, end of fixed-term 
contracts or other temporary contracts, military service, injuries, death or unknown exits.  
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Less workers quit voluntarily (0.7% compared to 1.55% in non-organized establishments) or 
separate at the end of a fixed-term contract (1.9%, compared to 2.4% in non-organized 
establishments). 
Table C1 shows that dismissal rates are a bit lower in establishments where unions are 
recognized even after controlling for a basic set of establishment and worker controls32, 
including 3-digit industry dummies and a full set of time dummies. However, voluntary quits 
appear to be a lot lower (lower by one third) in organized workplaces, this difference being 
statistically very significant. This suggests that workers could be better off in organized 
workplaces and less willing to leave. It could also mean that they are less productive and have 
therefore fewer outside options. However, when I add workers productivity at the firm level 
as an additional control variable in the regression model, I still find that workers in organized 
workplaces leave their firm less often (the point estimate is -0.21, which is slightly slower 
than what is found in column 2 of table C1, and the standard error is 0.10). This additional 
result reinforces the first interpretation: workers in organized workplaces might leave less 
often because they are better off. This would in turn mean that the wage premium obtained by 
unions is not compensated by losses on other aspects.   
Organized firms do not differ from their non-organized counterparts concerning retirements’ 
rates. The retirements’ rates are largely exogenous to the firms’ managing choices and mostly 
driven by the age profiles of the workers. Since I control in the regression models for the 
workers characteristics, including their age, it is normal to find no difference in term of 
retirements’ rates between organized and non-organized workplaces. The lower separation 
rate for core workers in organized establishments (e.g. those under open-ended contract) 
seems to be compensated by a larger separation rate for workers under fixed-term contract 
(even though this result is not statistically significant). This is consistent with the 
insider/outsider literature and the idea that unions defend at first core workers. Finally, there 
is no significant difference between organized and non-organized establishments when we 
consider all separations together (last column of table C1).  
 
Table C1. Establishment-level regressions: Union recognition and separations (REPONSE04+DMMO) 
 Dependent variable (quarterly rates): 
  Dismissals Quits Retirem. End-trial End-temp. All separat.
Union Recognition (establishment level) -0.087* -0.278*** -0.007 -0.135** 0.254 -0.239 
 (0.048) (0.089) (0.011) (0.065) (0.209) (0.300) 
       
time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Workers' characteristics controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Estab. controls: age, size, region yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Establishment controls: Industries 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 3-digit 
Observations 32484 32484 32484 32484 32484 32484 
R-squared 0.062 0.233 0.070 0.118 0.163 0.218 
Mean of the dependant variable 0.495 0.884 0.180 0.133 2.032 3.975 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. Workers' characteristics 
controls are the percentage of blue collars, clerks, technicians and managers as well as the percentage of 
women and workers above 40 years old at the establishment level. Establishment controls are identical to 
those used in previous tables.  
 
                                                 
32 Since the DMMO-EMMO files do not report these establishment characteristics, they are therefore drawn 
from the REPONSE survey and thus refer to 2004. The average workers’ characteristics at the establishment 
level come from the social security records DADS (see data section) and have been matched with the REPONSE 
dataset by the Ministry of Labor.   
